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Eurobarometer surveys regularly confirm that in a number of policy fields, citizens consider the 
European Union to be the appropriate level for political action. Even a brief look into the Maastricht 
Treaty shows that the European Union has very broad political competencies. In the EU, collectively 
perceived problems are dealt with by means of targeted public policy with the aim of collectively 
binding decisions. This corresponds to a general notion of governance (Kohler-Koch 1993). However, 
the notion of governance is commonly used with reference to the state and cannot be easily applied to 
the institutional system of the European Union. On the other hand, the political integration of Western 
Europe has led to a qualitative change both in the conditions under which governments act and in their 
ability to govern in the interests of their citizens. At the same time, the European Union – and more 
precisely its supranational community component – has been transformed into a political order with an 
action capacity of its own. The transfer of political competencies to the European level proceeds in 
small steps in the daily practice of governance and of adjudication. In large intervals, the results of 
these processes are codified in treaty form by intergovernmental conferences. In the light of these 
briefly sketched features and developments, it seems fruitful to have a closer look at “governance in a 
dynamic multi-level system”. 
The first part of this paper recalls the political and legal controversy about the nature of the political 
order of the Union with the aim of justifying the use of the term “governance” with reference to the EU. 
More or less isolated from the discussion on the nature of the EU and its possible or desirable future 
development, scholars increasingly deal with the effects of the integration process on responsible and 
effective governance within the member states. This debate is linked to a broader concern about the 
problems and prospects of governance under the conditions of increasing internationalization which 
finds its expression in the transnational expansion of functional subsystems of society, increasing 
interdependence and the globalization of problems. Policy analysis has started to deal with the changes 
in institutional structures and political processes caused by the Europeanization of policies. These 
questions are discussed in the second part which draws on the contributions to a forthcoming book 
edited by the authors (Jachtenfuchs/Kohler-Koch 1995). The third part focuses the meaning and the 
possibility of legitimate and efficient governance beyond the state framework. The fourth part 
discusses different institutional models for dealing with the problems of governance in a dynamic 
multi-level system resulting from the integration process. In the light of the perspective developed in 
this paper, the final part puts forward some general empirical, theoretical and normative questions for 
further research. 
 
1. Political Order and Governance 
Changes in the integration process have led to changes of the guiding questions of integration theory. 
In the 1960s, neofunctionalists analyzed European integration in the perspective of a possible 
transformation of the international system. A main concern of early integration theory was whether the 
institutionalization of cooperation in Europe could lead to a permanent disappearance of the security 
dilemma and a persistent change of the logic of international politics towards peaceful and effective 
problem-solving. This concern has never been purely analytical but has always included normative 
concerns. This is particularly true for the period when “regional integration” (Nye 1971; 
Lindberg/Scheingold 1971) was explicitly promoted not only as a political theory but as a political 
vision for the stabilization of the international system sharply opposed to realist theories and political 
designs of balance-of-power politics.  
These diverging normative goals and research interests were in the last resort based on different 
conceptions of politics and led to sharply diverging assessments of the nature of the emerging 
European institutions. Neofunctionalists considered them as a nucleus of a new political authority 
above the nation-state. The superior problem-solving capacities of these institutions were expected to 
result in a slow reorientation of the expectations of societal actors (in particular elites and interest 
groups) towards the new center which was expected to satisfy their interests better than national 
governments. This would create the preconditions for an incremental transfer of formal competencies 
to the new institutions. The positive performance of European institutions would give legitimacy to 
their actions, create broad diffuse support (in the Eastonian sense) of this “would-be polity” (Lindberg/Scheingold 1970) and thus lead to a transformation of the European Community into a 
political system “sui generis”. The fact that the European Commission in particular has used 
neofunctionalist integration theory as its integration ideology makes it somewhat difficult to assess 
whether neofunctionalism has indeed constructed a kind of automatism toward a European federal 
state in the way critics often objected. Apart from this issue, neofunctionalism has probably 
concentrated too much on the process dimension and thereby neglected the thinking about possible 
stable institutional outcomes of the integration process (cf. the self-criticism of Schmitter 1992). Still, 
there were scenarios for future persistent patterns of integration which included the “asymmetrical 
overlap” of Community and national competencies besides the possibility of a “regional state” and a 
“regional commune” (Haas 1971: 4). Even the modest scenario of an “asymmetrical overlap” 
designates a type of supranational institutionalization which cannot be reduced to a limited, specific 
and reversible transfer of competencies to a regional organization leaving intact the sovereignty and 
autonomy of its member states.  
Seen from the opposite point of view, this was precisely the case. Realist and intergovernmentalist 
writers criticized the teleological elements of neofunctionalism which was accused to take his desire 
for an overcoming of the nation-state as a reality. In the realist view, the European Community of the 
1960s and 1970s still was an organization for the coordination of state interests in which sovereignty 
was not overcome but exercised jointly. Member states remain the decisive actors in the integration 
process and fully control its institutional development (Hoffmann 1966, 1982). For this reason, there 
can be no question of a political order superseding or even replacing the nation-state. 
This controversy in political science found its equivalent in legal science where the debate was about 
the conceptual analysis and the normative assessment of the emerging system of European law. During 
the first phases of integration, the characterization of the European Community as an association for 
limited purposes (“Zweckverband funktioneller Integration”; Ipsen 1972) expressed a broad consensus. 
In recent years, an increasing number of scholars have claimed that European law constitutes a 
supranational legal order with a quality of its own and is in fact a constitution for the member states 
themselves as well as for groups and citizens within the member states (Mancini 1991). Like 
neofunctionalists in political science, legal scholars claiming that the integration process has led to a 
new form of political and legal order had to struggle in order to find a proper designation for this new 
order. The term “sui generis” is merely a label which stresses that the new polity has features distinct 
from both international organizations and states. It does not identify the distinctive features of the new 
phenomenon itself (Joerges 1995). 
The controversy on the nature of the EC/EU and on the driving forces and actors of the integration 
process continues both in law and in political science. In political science, there are still approaches 
inspired by neofunctionalism (Burley/Mattli 1993; Busch 1995; Sandholtz/Zysman 1989; Sandholtz 
1993) trying to explain integration dynamics at least partly by resorting to preference changes of 
societal actors as a result of the integration process. At the same time, the competing position is also 
put forward, namely that the integration process develops on the basis of interstate agreements and that 
the European Union was an institution for the coordination of state interests (Keohane/Hoffmann 1991; 
Moravcsik 1991, 1993). In legal science, the judgment of the German constitutional court on the 
Maastricht treaty has reanimated the debate between those who claim that European law is derived 
from decisions of sovereign member states and the European Union thus an association of states 
(“Staatenverbund”) and those who hold that it represents a new type of legal order irreducible to 
domestic or international law (von Bogdandy 1993)2. Stressing the opposition between these two 
streams of thought and attempting to associate them with the two theoretical schools of either 
“neofunctionalism” or “intergouvernmentalism” hides the similarities which emerged in the ongoing 
debate. The new approaches both recognize the central role of state negotiations for the integration 
process and resist teleological temptations. Although with different accents, they stress the importance 
of societal actors and changing actor constellations and acknowledge the particularly important role of 
institutions for interstate politics. In any case, a perspective stressing the distinctive importance of 
interstate bargains does not necessarily preclude that member state preferences are shaped directly or 
indirectly (via societal actors) by the integration process and by European institutions (Gehring 1994; 
Olsen 1995).  
Research on European integration has in the last years continued to focus on the dynamics of the EU’s 
institutional development. The continuing actuality of the link between deepening and widening of the 
Union is increasingly attracting attention in this line of research and has gained new relevance after the end of the cold war bacause of possible membership applications by Eastern European states and the 
1996 revision conference of the Maastricht treaty. A second perspective has, however, gained 
importance which had been largely neglected during the first phase of integration research. The 
comparative analysis of political systems as well as policy analysis become increasingly aware of the 
changes in state action as a consequence of the integration process. It is increasingly perceived that the 
particular features of political institutions, political processes and policies can neither be understood 
within member states taken alone nor in a comparative perspective without taking into account the EU 
dimension. This second line of research is not only concerned with the multiple and far-reaching 
effects of the EU on polity, politics and policy in the member states but more fundamentally with the 
changes in responsible and efficient governance. 
Research of this kind develops more or less independently from the controversies on the nature and the 
perspectives of the integration process but starts from the empirical analysis of the EU-system. This 
focus on the present reality of the EU may be regrettable as it seems to prevent the results from being 
generalized. Comparisons in time are, however, not excluded in principle but only neglected as a 
matter of fact and may follow later. In any case, this perspective objects to the commonly held view 
that the EU is facing decisive choices for its development. Competing scenarios in this respect foresee 
either a rapid eastern enlargement coupled with forms of variable geometry within the Union or the 
consolidation and further deepening of the present EU coupled with special-type associations of third 
states below the membership threshold. There are numerous possible combinations of those two 
alternatives in a process of muddling through and they will certainly trigger important changes. The 
recent northern enlargement is also likely to lead to adaptations of the acquis communautaire. In 
addition, the entering into force of the third stage of economic and monetary union will be most 
certainly be followed by major changes within the EU.  
Still, all this does not preclude that analyses of the present reality of the EU can be generalized. As in 
the case of previous treaty changes and enlargements, the upcoming changes of the next few years are 
not likely to lead to a fundamental change in the nature of the political order of the European Union. 
Apart from obvious differences in (sometimes major) details, member state governments have already 
established their positions to a degree that makes the “saut qualitatif” of normative EU literature at 
least for the 1996 revision conference very unlikely. It is therefore useful to start from a scenario which 
could be called “persistence of Maastricht”. This label does not preclude even major changes in the 
institutional order of the EU but excludes a fundamental transformation of the EU towards a federal 
state.  
Dealing with this kind of multilevel system seems even more promising as the ensuing change of 
governance is only one aspect of the organization of politics under the conditions of increasing 
internationalization (Voruba 1993; Zürn 1995), although a particularly important one. 
Internationalization and the related phenomena require that successful political problem-solving be 
organized transnationally if it is not to lead to a withdrawal of political responsibility and the 
increasing reliance on alternative mechanisms such as the market or private self-regulation. How 
optimal collective decisions can be achieved under the conditions of increasing internationalization and 
interdependence has been extensively discussed in regime theory (Kohler-Koch 1989; Rittberger 1993) 
and in the debate on “governance without government” (Rosenau/Czempiel 1992; Kohler-Koch 1993; 
Gehring 1995). A common concern in this debate is with the conditions and possibilities of governance 
independent of the existence of a central authority and beyond the territorial congruence of those who 
govern with those who are subject to governance. In this context, governance takes place by several 
formally autonomous but factually interdependent actors. The internationalization of politics thus 
pushed forward the emergence of new, non-territorial forms of governance (Ruggie 1993).  
The transformation of governance in the European Union refers to three aspects, namely action 
capacity and responsibility of politics, changes in political structures and processes, and the 
transformation of statehood. Internationalization leads to a decrease in political action capacity because 
state action is largely confined to territorial boundaries whereas actors which are targets of state 
policies can move transnationally or are even totally free from territorial links. The joint exercise of 
sovereignty in the EU enlarges the territorial scope for political action but on the other hand 
incorporates its member states into a complex decision-making system thus confronting them with the 
problems of horizontal coordination of political action in negotiation systems. Even if theoretical 
considerations show that at least in principle, horizontal coordination is equivalent to hierarchical 
governance in terms of efficiency (Scharpf 1991), horizontal coordination faces serious problems of implementation and control (Majone 1995) and is vulnerable to the pathologies of joint-decision 
making in interlocked systems (Scharpf 1988). In addition, horizontal coordination is problematic in 
terms of democratic accountability (Scharpf 1993; Graf Kielmansegg 1995). For these reasons, there is 
wide agreement that the European Union has a lower action capacity than its member states and that 
the action capacity of the latter is reduced by the constraints of negotiation processes within the 
European institutions. A critical discussion of this assessment follows in the next section of this paper. 
At the same time, politics in the European Union transforms institutional structures and political 
processes in the member states. When national policies are partly supplemented and partly replaced by 
European policies, the latter are necessarily unable to respect the particular material conditions, actor 
constellations and historical developments in the member states, thus destroying or transforming old 
structures or creating new ones. This development sometimes leads to sudden changes in power 
relationships between actors and actor groups within the member states which may have evolved in 
long historical struggles. It creates new points of access to the political process for actors formerly 
excluded or left at the margins. Further dimensions of these kinds of changes concern the centralization 
or decentralization of political and administrative competencies and institutions, preferred instruments 
of governance, dominant problem-solving philosophies and the relationship between state and interest 
groups or political parties (Héritier et al. 1994: 20). 
The third dimension of the transformation of governance in the European Union is the transformation 
of statehood understood as a general organizing principle. This is to be distinguished from the second 
point mentioned above, the changes in the dimensions of polity, politics and policy. We refer to 
transformation of statehood only if and insofar the principle of territorially organized and responsible 
politics itself is at stake. A second condition must also be met: these changes have to follow 
necessarily from processes of internationalization instead of being the result of explicit political 
decisions. In the latter case, the transfer of political decision-making competencies and allocative 
functions from the democratic state to the market is merely a change in the dominant problem-solving 
philosophy which may lead to a change of the form of the state from an interventionist welfare state to 
a minimalist neoliberal3 state. In our usage, this development only qualifies as “transformation of 
statehood” if it follows necessarily from the internationalization of functional subsystems of society 
because it is impossible to create the necessary institutions for responsible and efficient governance. 
 
2. The New Shape of Politics 
In this part, we will confront the general assumption about the state losing sovereignty and autonomy 
in the course of the integration process with empirical evidence and plausible arguments telling a 
different story4. We argue that in order to gain a better understanding of the changes taking place in 
the European polity as a whole (i.e. in the European Union and in its member states) it is necessary to 
look at the transformations in the nature and conceptions of governance. These changes certainly 
cannot be attributed exclusively to the dynamics of the integration process and to the properties of the 
EU system alone. Both, however, contribute to a large extent to the transformation of governance and 
in this respect to the role of the state in Europe.  
The still prominent discussion about the supranational “rescue” or “decline” of the nation state 
(Wildenmann 1991; Milward 1992; Moravcsik 1994) certainly no longer starts from the assumption 
that the state can be modeled as a “unitary actor”, as the “one and indivisible” body of unitary policy-
making based on parliamentary majorities and the undisputed right and capability of the executive to 
implement whatever decision is taken thanks to the “monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force” 
(Max Weber). This concept of the modern state has always been an ideal type with limited descriptive 
accuracy even in the second half of the last century when it was developed (Ellwein 1992). But 
dividing political actors into national and European executives on the one hand and societal groups on 
the other, attributing to them “distinct and independent sets of preferences” and modeling their 
relationship as an “ongoing set of bargains between principals and agents” (Moravcsik 1994: 4) means 
to uphold a concept of governing which is synonymous with political control and in this way still is 
very much in line with the traditional model of the state: governing is what governments to, and the 
effectiveness of their activities derives from the resources they command because those will define 
their relative bargaining power in relation to societal actors.  
This concept, prominent in the Steuerungsdebatte of the 1960s and 1970s, changed when research 
began to focus on implementation problems. As a result, a different analytical perspective slowly 
emerged. The problems of “governability” were no longer perceived in terms of insufficient intelligence of bureaucracy, in the lack of governments’ ability to take decisions or in a choice of the 
wrong instruments but in the particular character of the objects or targets of governance (Mayntz 1987, 
1993a). These “objects of governing” were now conceived of as complex “sub-systems of society” 
with their own internal dynamics making them “impenetrable for outsiders in a double sense, both 
cognitively as well as in terms of the possibility to be purposefully influenced” (Mayntz 1993a: 14). 
Therefore, consecutive research centered on the question of how to conceptualize the problematique of 
governance as it became obvious that political guidance through command and control over “target-
group behavior” cannot be achieved. 
Policy-analysis (Héritier 1993; Scharpf 1993a), economics (Williamson 1975) and international 
relations theory (Rosenau/Czempiel 1992; Kohler-Koch 1993) have slowly come to a common 
understanding that governance is about coordinating multiple players in a complex setting of mutual 
dependence. Governing then is not synonymous with what governments do by themselves but includes 
“… all those activities of social, political and administrative actors that can be seen as purposeful 
efforts to guide, steer, control or manage (sectors or facets of) societies … Social-political forms of 
governing are forms in which public or private actors do not act separately but in conjunction, together, 
in combination, that is to say in ‘co’arrangements … ‘governance’ [means] the patterns that emerge 
from governing activities …” (Kooiman 1993: 2).  
The proliferation of networks is a condition as well as a consequence of the growing differentiation of 
functional subsystems, the political emancipation of large corporate actors able to take strategic actions 
by themselves, and the increasing complexity of interdependence (Mayntz 1993b: 43). At the same 
time, it is an expression of the progressing recognition on the part of social and political actors that a 
new mode of governance has to develop which rests on the continuous process of interaction. 
Governing, in this view, has to be organized in a way “to enhance the independent adaptive, reactive, 
and problem-solving capacities of societal actors, which means to motivate and to enable them to react 
purposefully at any moment ot changing conditions” (Mayntz 1993a: 15). In other words, “governance 
becomes less a matter of engineering than of gardening” (March/Olsen 1983: 292). 
The integration process brings together actors which have a special interest in collective decision-
making in networks instead of unilateral state regulation. This cannot be reduced to the desire of egoist 
actors to have access to financial resources. The literature on European R & D policy and on European 
structural policy shows that European networks not only provide financial resources for the actors 
involved but also supply common problem-solving philosophies and give legitimacy to their actions. 
Instead of being objects of governance, actors in European networks, be they interest groups, 
enterprises, regions or research institutes, become partners of joint problem-solving. European 
structural policy, for instance, does not only consist in an increase in the role of regions at the expense 
of member states due to subsidies from the structural funds. Instead, structural policy offers the 
opportunity for regions to use the resources offered (financial support, strategic concepts and 
legitimacy) for achieving new action capacities and a new identity (Marks 1995).  
The same applies for R & D policy. In this case, public-private partnerships have already been 
advocated at national level. They were justified by the assumption that the nature of the problem at 
stake was characterized by high uncertainty about cause-effect relationships. Policy success requires 
considerable financial means but takes a long time to materialize. On the basis of this common 
problem-definition, the “European Roundtable” of leading enterprises in information technology was 
created and became influential in policy-formulation. It was neither a coalition of industry to get access 
to new European subsidies nor an association created by the Commission in order to support its policy 
plans in the Council. Instead, as in other policy fields (Jachtenfuchs 1995), these kinds of coalitions are 
only made possible on the basis of a common problem definition. 
The increasing importance of policy networks should not be interpreted in the sense that the state was 
just losing more and more power to a large number of other actors. Networks are always embedded 
into an institutional context determining the role of individual actors but are much less institutionalized 
themselves. In addition, European networks are characterized by a higher fluctuation of membership 
than national ones (Héritier et al. 1994: 9). The existence of complex negotiation systems in European 
policy-making may even paradoxically increase the autonomy of state administrations and 
governments vis-à-vis societal actors (Grande 1995). 
The complexity of this negotiation process stems less from the material content of the problems to be 
dealt with but from the fact that these problems are at the same time also political, legal, and/or 
economic problems in which different sets of actors in usually largely differing national contexts have to be taken into account. This is already true for policy-making within the member states but even 
more in a Union of fifteen members and a corresponding plurality of political conflicts, legal systems 
and economic situations. As a consequence, the Commission has to rely on outside expertise and 
support in order to assess the internal consistency and the acceptability of its proposals. 
In this situation of strong dependence from outside information and the necessity to take decisions 
together with other actors and with the member states, one could assume that the Commission could 
become dependent from private actors to a degree which makes it almost unable to pursue the 
“Community interest” or a policy oriented at general as opposed to private welfare. The same applies 
to the member states with the only difference that contrary to the Commission they do not have to take 
into account the political, legal and economic situation in the other member states in the process of 
policy-making. The very fact that in the European Union decision are taken in a multi-level system 
helps the European as well as the national administrations to gain a certain degree of autonomy from 
outside influence. It is remarkable, however, to note the degree of cooperation of Commission and 
member state administrators during the preparatory phase of a proposal as well as in the decision-
making phase (Wessels 1995).  
Private actors, on the other hand, find their possibilities of access to the decision-making process 
limited by the multiplication of institutions and committees involved in the process because there is no 
central point of access anymore. Instead, interest groups have to pursue time-intensive and costly 
lobbying in multiple fora at the European as well as at the national level. For European interest 
associations which are organized as “associations of associations” the additional problem emerges that 
due to their internal heterogeneity and distance from member enterprises they have major difficulties in 
forming a common position and can hardly act as corporate actors. In recent years, considerable efforts 
have been made to strengthen the action capacity and the political power of interest associations in 
particular in the economic field. There is now a stronger differentiation of sector-specific associations 
with a larger internal homogeneity and also an increased direct concertation of large European 
enterprises, partly through internal reforms of European-level associations, partly through informal 
alliances (Kohler-Koch 1995b). These reforms were intended to increase the position of interest groups 
with regard to the Commission which in the last decades has acquired a strong identity and a 
considerable action capacity as a corporate actor. In addition, the Commission has the privilege of 
being the “process-manager” (Eichener 1992, 1995). Even national administrations can use the inbuilt 
necessity of compromising and the temporal closure of the interstate decision-making process for all 
but state actors in order to gain autonomy with regard to interest groups (Grande 1995). 
The distinctive role of regulatory policy-making is another characteristic feature of the EU. A main 
reason for its importance lies in the fact that despite considerable increases in the last years the budget 
of the EU remains relatively small and is still to a large extent allocated to agricultural spending. In 
addition, the major part of the budget consists in contributions from the member states – despite the 
label “own resources” attached to these funds. Distributive policies such as spending by the structural 
funds are, however, usually accompanied by massive conflicts among the member states desiring to get 
“their” share from the available funds (Marks 1995). Regulatory policy-making, on the contrary, shifts 
direct or indirect costs of a policy to those who are regulated. These costs can easily reach several 
billion ECU (e.g. in the case of clean air policy) whereas the immediate costs for political decision-
makers are usually trivial. Thus, regulatory policy is not only cheap for the Union but avoids conflicts 
among the member states about the distribution of costs and benefits. Still, conflicts of the latter kind 
may emerge if a policy severely affects the competitiveness of economic sectors in some member 
states but not in others.  
Distributive or redistributive policies are easily politicized because it is usually easy to establish cost-
benefit analyses for the issue at stake. In contrast, the costs and benefits of regulatory policies are 
usually difficult to establish and depend on complicated and controversial assessments which do not 
lend themselves to clear dichotomies between winners and losers furthering politicization. Regulatory 
policy easily becomes the domain of experts and corresponds to the Commission’s view of its own role 
as an unpolitical institution with the task of putting forward conceptually solid and scientifically 
proven proposals for the solution of practical problems (Wallace 1995). As the amount of technical and 
scientific information often exceeds expertise and knowledge available to the Commission, it has to 
rely on a complicated and wide-ranging network of consultative committees and other bodies. In some 
areas (e.g. environmental policy and medical drugs), the technical character of the policy is so strong 
that the establishment of specialized regulatory agencies following the US-example is decided or planned. This development is likely to define the respective policies as technical and non-distributive, 
thus leaving them out of the political debate. It is also likely to further the emergence of transnational 
communities of technical and scientific expertise (Haas 1992). At the same time, there are strong 
arguments in favor of the thesis that regulatory policy-making and the related proliferation of “non-
majoritarian institutions” (Majone 1993) have an inbuilt tendency to reduce the influence of 
parliaments on the policy-process. Normative judgments about this development depend on the 
possible role of the European Parliament for the legitimation of the European political order.  
It has been argued that in the European Union redistributive policies (which can easily be politicized) 
are possible only to a limited degree as a matter of principle and at the same time are not even 
desirable from a normative point of view (Majone 1995). If this argument is true and it is also true that 
in the EU there is a structural bias towards regulatory policy-making by non-majoritarian institutions, 
we are indeed faced with a transformation of statehood by European integration. The transfer of large 
areas of policy-making to independent regulatory bodies is only acceptable from a normative point of 
view if these authorities can be held responsible before parliament in one way or another. If at the 
same time a full parliamentary accountability of EU institutions faces structural problems (Graf 
Kielmansegg 1995; Scharpf 1993b), the integration process systematically undermines the possibility 
of democratic policy-making, democracy understood as parliamentary responsibility. 
A review of studies of singular policy fields in the first place leads to a contradictory image of the 
transformation of politics in the integration process. It seems worth mentioning that the hypothesis 
according to which the unanimity rule in the Council would result in low standards, a harmonization at 
the lowest common denominator or even in non-decisions in some cases, is at least not simply 
confirmed. On the contrary, case studies show that despite unfavorable structural factors, policy-
making in the EU has resulted in efficient problem-solving and a regulation at a high level (Eichener 
1995). It has to be noted, however, that systematic and methodologically sound comparative research 
in this area is still lacking. Further research has to be done in order to avoid far-reaching 
generalizations on the basis of individual and narrowly confined case studies. Empirical studies also 
show that the notion of “high standards” which is particularly important in the scientific as well as in 
the political discussion is at least problematic given the enormous complexity of many policy measures 
and the complicated overlap of European regulations with pre-existing national ones. In practice, 
European regulation sometimes replace, sometimes supplement and sometimes transform pre-existing 
and often complicated national regulations. Combinations of all these patterns are possible as well as 
the creation of completely new measures in areas which were not previously covered with national 
legislation. In this situation, it is a quite dubious enterprise to compare European and national 
standards with reference to their “level”. 
Another effect of the integration process is the transformation of established national political 
structures, political processes and policies. Changes occur because of the impact of European policy-
making and because of attempts to influence European policy-making. These changes, however, take 
place along national paths. The respective structures, processes and policies are not simply replaced or 
harmonized by European policies because institutions and policy-specific patterns in the member states 
have historically developed a certain persistence against external influence which cannot easily be 
overcome by European policies. For this reason, there is no increasing uniformity of national systems 
as a result of the Europeanization of politics. Politics on the national as well as on the European level is 
and remains distinct and fragmented. On the whole, it seems that European integration makes the 
political landscape in the individual member states more diverse and leads to an increased complexity 
in particular in those member states with an already well-established regulatory tradition. One should, 
however, not easily dismiss the possibility that this apparent increase in complexity in reality hides 
trends pointing to a simultaneous uniformization of political developments within the EU. One 
example for such a trend could be the increasing replacement of public intervention by regulation 
through markets or by autonomous self-coordination of actors as a result of the integration process, in 
other words the withdrawal of the state in favor of the market or private actors (Streeck 1994; Scharpf 
1995). 
European policy-making is a reaction to the decreasing link between problems and specific territories 
and at the same time leads to the emergence of non-territorially bound politics. The European Union 
looks like an attempt to compensate the uneven expansion of functional sub-systems by supranational 
politics and thus to reestablish the control and action capacities of the political system on a higher level. 
This expansion of functional sub-systems is not an autonomous process but to a large extent caused by the European Union. Stimulated by the existence of a institutional framework and a European market, 
political regulation and economic processes extend over the territorial borders of individual member 
states into the entire territory of the EU and partly into even larger spaces created by special 
agreements (European Economic Area, association agreements). The politics of the European Union 
stimulates this process of internationalization even beyond the European space. Whereas the Union is a 
reaction to internationalization and interdependence, it is also a major cause of both and thus in some 
way creates the conditions of its own existence. In any case, European policy-making cannot be 
reduced to an attempt of member states to control the consequences of (mostly economic) 
interdependence by the joint exercise of sovereignty and to save the autonomy of the nation-state 
through institutionalized cooperation. 
This attempt of states to create political action potentials by international cooperation has a price in the 
form of multiple consensus requirements which in turn reduce the autonomy and the action capacity of 
the state. Even in its relation to societal actors the state increasingly occupies the role of a partner 
instead of an institution which unilaterally sets the rules of the game and determines policy outputs. 
This development is not identical with a decrease of state dominance because it is precisely the 
proliferation of transnational networks furthered by the integration process which allows the state an 
even deeper penetration of society. In addition, the structure of the political process of the Union gives 
the state further autonomy in relation to societal actors (Kohler-Koch 1995a).  
Politics in the European Union does therefore not automatically lead to sub-optimal outcomes but to 
changes of national political structures, processes and policies. There are no solid empirical studies 
available yet but it seems at least plausible that in the political system of the European Union the 
loosening territorial links of politics and the division of regulatory competencies on different 
institutional levels even changes the fundamental principles of territorially based governance. This 
refers to the apparent systematic transfer of allocative competencies from the state to the market and 
the seeming impossibility to develop a new political architecture which allows a democratic political 
control and participation. Even if governmental action is strengthened and weakened at the same time, 
this development leads to fundamental questions regarding the possible legitimacy of this kind of 
political order. 
 
3. Governance Beyond the State 
The real deficit of integration theory consists in its inability to conceptualize political order in different 
terms than in the common types of “state” and “state system”. Patterns of thinking in the social 
sciences as well as in legal science are marked by these ordering principles of modernity and these 
disciplines therefore do not posses even the necessary notions to conceptualize governance beyond the 
state.  
Thinking in terms of state and state system has repeatedly been criticized by reflective and postmodern 
approaches in international relations theory5. These critics insist that the state system and its 
constituent units, the states, are no unchangeable units but represent the present state of a historical 
development which has not necessarily reached its final stage in the form of a system of sovereign 
states. Postmodernists in particular add to this the diagnosis that this development originating in the 
creation of nation states in Western Europe has led to the emergence of a dominant intellectual 
discourse which makes political authority over territorially defined units seem justified and natural.  
The emergence of modern West European nation-states has been studied in large-scale efforts of 
historical sociology (Tilly 1975; Rokkan 1975). The conceptual understanding of the erosion of this 
model has to rely on metaphors such as the “new middle ages” (Bull 1977) which rest on analogies to 
historical appearances of a polycentric and overlapping organization of political order. We do not want 
to dismiss the possibility that a comparative study of forms of governance in different historical 
periods and in different cultures may yield substantial insights into the functional requirements of 
political order because it is able to shed light on the seemingly unproblematic and self-evident 
preconditions of the emergence and stability of the Western European model. Nevertheless, the 
specific conditions of political order in past times are too different from those of the present leading to 
the erosion and transformation of statehood. In any case, the old middle ages are of little help for the 
understanding of the new middle ages because the crucial role of religion and its institutions for the 
integration of society and state system in the middle ages (Schulze 1994) do not find any present-day 
equivalent. For these reasons, the metaphor of the new middle ages merely expresses the feeling of an unclear and 
indeterminate situation without being able to point to concrete elements of a desirable or possible 
model of non-territorially based governance. In addition, the reference to old or new middle ages is 
also unable to serve as an institutional blueprint because in the course of enlightenment, the people has 
occupied the place of the sovereign. Its right of sovereign self-determination can only be restricted in 
pre-established limits and procedures, installing a government for collective action which is controlled 
politically and serves only for a limited period of time. This implies that governance is only legitimate 
if those who are subject to it are identical with those who are responsible for the establishment of the 
rules determining how political power is acquired, exercised, limited and lost. Legitimate governance 
is only possible with reference to a nation united in a territory and in the last resort governing itself via 
representative and responsible institutions (Graf Kielmansegg 1977). 
In this view, responsible government is only possible in the territorially confined nation-state. In this 
model, borders have an important function because they create the distinction between “inside” and 
“outside”, thus making possible the resistance to external interventions into the territorially organized 
political community. However, borders do not only have pragmatic functions but also normative ones. 
The function of borders for the internal relations of political communities consists in their contribution 
to social integration. They define spaces for communication and fix the limits of the solidarity required 
from each citizen as encompassing only those citizens living within the same borders. Although social 
integration is mainly a social process which is largely driven by relations of production and the 
development of productive forces, the state also contributes to normative integration. It does so as a 
constitutional state by guaranteeing fundamental rights and as a law-making state by codifying and 
directing social change. On the one hand, the state is norm-conserving because each change in social 
norms has to conform to legal norms and to be inserted into a system of positive law. On the other 
hand, law-making by the state also includes a dynamic element because social change is expressed in 
the political process of legislation. Thus, the politicization of social situations and demands can 
become a motor of change. 
This model of legitimate governance is logically bound to the state. It only works to the degree that the 
problems which are brought up and identified as collective tasks by society can at least in principle be 
solved by the representatives of this very society. It comes under pressure if in the process of 
internationalization economic interdependence, transnational communication, and the reach of modern 
weapons increase to an extent that the claim of territorially bound politics to solve problems within its 
own territory effectively and efficiently cannot be upheld anymore. 
The pragmatic solution to this problem consists in the organization of different forms of interstate 
cooperation. Only in the exceptional case of the European Union, this “management of 
interdependence” is organized supranationally. Usually, there are softer forms of institutionalized 
cooperation between states such as international organizations or international regimes. This kind of 
collective problem-solving is not considered problematic as long as it touches only the margins of the 
life-world of citizens, or is accepted as “high politics” which can only be solved by cooperation 
between states or is considered as a successful increase of state autonomy. The fact that a major part of 
this kind of international cooperation takes place unobserved by citizens hides international politics 
behind a legitimating veil. Even in domestic politics it is not possible to discuss every political matter 
in public discourse. The normative criterion of democratic and therefore controlled governance 
requires, however, that each political issue can at least in principle be politicized and thus become a 
subject of public debates over controversial options for assessment and action. In this discourse, 
responsibility for political action is made transparent and can therefore be subject to sanctions. If, 
however, the politicization of an issue is neither able to bring the discussion back into the domestic 
arena nor to guarantee that decisions are taken by actors which can be held responsible politically for 
these very decisions in elections, the legitimating veil of international politics is torn away. Its results 
may be considered useful and effective but for the citizen it is clearly and obviously not a case of 
responsible politics anymore (Graf Kielmansegg 1995). 
International cooperation for collective problem-solving – be it in the form of international regimes or 
of international or supranational organizations – also has consequences for the ability of the state to 
contribute to the normative integration of society. This is particularly true if this cooperation has 
achieved a level and quality of institutionalization as in the case of the EU because it undermines the 
monopoly of the state to pursue integration through law. These observations which are also important 
for political science have been mainly made by lawyers (Weiler 1981, 1982; Joerges 1995). The core of the European integration project, the market without internal borders, has been created mainly by 
the case law of the European Court of Justice and by highly technical legal measures of “negative 
integration” (Scharpf 1995). The fact that political scientists and constitutional lawyers have often 
regarded the European Union as a “mere” economic community and have considered the rapidly 
growing body of European economic law as a matter for specialized lawyers (Joerges 1993) may 
together with the seemingly technical nature of very specialized problems explain the systematic 
neglect of these issues by political scientists and constitutional lawyers.  
In the last years, there have been increasing efforts to loosen the functional link between European law 
and the creation of the common market by transforming the system of community law into a legitimate 
fundamental legal order similar to the constitutions of the member states (Mancini 1991). The 
reference to common constitutional traditions, the adherence to the European convention on human 
rights or the adoption of a catalogue of fundamental rights as proposed by the European Parliament are 
certainly necessary for the emergence of a legitimating constitution but probably not sufficient. These 
elements had to be supplemented by the existence of a European society with the ability to politically 
articulate itself (Habermas 1992; Lepsius 1991). 
Whether this possibility exists is debated at present. In its judgment on the Maastricht treaty, the 
German constitutional court has argued that democratic processes can only take place in a society in 
which controversial political positions are debated in public discourse mainly by political parties and in 
the media. Neither political parties nor mass media exist on a European level. The judgment shows in 
an exemplary way the difficulty to think about a legitimate political order in categories different from 
those drawn from the example of the highly integrated nation-state. The resulting dilemma is obvious: 
a European state is impossible but a retreat to the nation-state is also infeasible because the 
internationalization of decision-making and law-making competencies makes it less and less possible 
to solve problems according to the ideal of the democratic territorial state. After the completion of the 
internal market of the European Union there is a real danger of “democracy illusions” (Streeck 1994) if 
politics is still judged with reference to the sovereign state which is able to solve the problems on its 
territory and with the means available there. In this case, the state and political parties will be 
confronted with demands they are unable to solve whereas at the same time, European institutions do 
not meet the legitimacy criteria of democratic governance.  
 
4. Legitimate Governance in Europe 
It is relatively easy to come to the diagnosis that the model of territorially based governance in Europe 
is changing: The unique historical coincidence between political authority, economic processes and 
societal self-definition which makes up the model of the nation-state is slowly falling apart. This 
statement does, however, not provide an answer to the question how the normative model of legitimate 
democratic governance can survive under these circumstances. The inability to understand the present 
state and nature of the European Union and to make empirical forecasts or normative teleological 
statements about its future development corresponds to the inability to conceptualize democracy and 
authority beyond the state.  
It is not by accident that the discussion on the future development of the EU frequently returns to the 
question whether the European Union should or could develop into a federal state (Wildenmann 1991). 
In other words, the debate on the future of the EU does not put into question the model of “state” but 
merely asks whether this model can be extended to a polity such as the EU with fifteen or more 
members. Even if it can hardly be denied that such a Union has to be built on strong federal elements 
as argued by Sbragia (1992) or Scharpf (1994), even this discussion does not put into question the 
basic model of territorially based governance but locates the EU merely on a continuum between an 
association of states and a federal state. Thinking about a possible legitimation of the EU as an 
independent form of the organization of politics distinct from the former two models has just begun 
(von Bogdandy 1993; Schmitter 1992).  
Political authority needs legitimacy. In the case of the state, this legitimacy is created by the fact that 
state action is always bound to a set of fundamental rights which is usually contained in the 
constitution and by democratic procedures of control which assure that authority is exercised only for 
limited periods of time. Neither the link to fundamental rights nor the existence of democratic 
procedures are, however, eternally valid elements of legitimate governance but idealized justifications 
of real relationships. They are theories which the political system has created during its development. 
As theories in (and not about) the political system they guarantee the self-legitimation of the political system (Luhmann 1981, 1987). Expressed in functionalist language, they are possible and stable 
solutions to the problem of legitimation of authority.  
One possibility to react to the political, economic, legal and social pressures created by the integration 
process is to regard the democratic constitutional state as the only possible form of legitimate 
governance and to defend it against all changes – even with the risk of creating “democracy illusions” 
(Isensee et al. 1985; Kirchhoff 1992; BVerfGE 1994). A functional approach on the other hand at least 
in principle allows thinking about functional equivalents to present mechanisms of legitimation. At 
first sight, such an approach looks technocratic and incompatible with the requirement of democracy if 
it defines legitimacy as the generalized preparedness to follow the decisions of the political system, 
denies the possibility of assessing legitimacy by normative criteria and as a consequence considers 
legitimation merely as a neutral device allowing the efficient use of authority (Luhmann 1969). 
However, it is indispensable for the empirical analysis of the present shape of the political system of 
the EU to look for existing mechanisms of legitimation independently of their normative quality. This 
approach can be justified even more because even national political systems have institutions which 
are not democratically legitimated in a narrower sense despite their importance for the allocation of 
resources or of life chances. Constitutional courts and independent central banks in several countries 
are examples of this kind. In addition, in several EU member states a considerable amount of law-
making is done directly by government or by the administration. These forms of administrative law-
making hardly conform to the ideal-type of parliamentary control of legislative activity. These 
examples illustrate that even democratic political systems create mechanisms of governance which do 
not correspond to the ideal of democratic control of government. By saying this we do not suggest that 
the European Union should easily give up any attempt of democratic legitimation but only that the 
theory of democracy as well as constitutional law doctrine should take into account the consequences 
of internationalization and social complexity for the constitution and exercise of political authority 
(Held 1991). 
The analysis of mechanisms of legitimation is also a tool for the better understanding of the nature of 
the political system in question. The key to this are the expectations of persons or groups subject to 
governance. Historically, Western European states have developed a specific national structure of 
cognitive and normative expectations of individuals, groups and organizations with regard to 
legitimate governance. In the process of European integration, expectations of these actors in the 
member states are effectively transformed and as a result, the model of legitimate governance (in the 
sense of a theory in the political system) also changes (Jachtenfuchs 1995). On the other hand, the 
European political system itself creates new or different theories of legitimation which do not 
necessarily find an equivalent in the nation-state but which may lead to the acceptance of decisions of 
the European political system6.  
In this perspective, a stable and legitimate European political order does not appear impossible from 
the outset. Three possible types of legitimation for European governance will be briefly discussed here. 
The first is a neoconservative “economic constitution” (Behrens 1994; Petersmann 1994; 
Streit/Mussler 1995). In this model, the task of the state is only to guarantee civic liberties and the role 
of European institutions is to guarantee a functioning market. Demands for the correction of market 
failures, social welfare systems and the creation of a more just society are rejected. If these elements 
can be combined in the expectations of citizens, groups or organizations, a stable coexistence of a 
European and a national political order seems possible. From its very logic, such an economic 
constitution should be sheltered from parliamentary influence, be it national or European. It offers a 
realistic possibility to combine a minimalist conception of political authority in the nation-state with 
the guarantee of a European free market without fundamental legitimation problems. Politically, it is 
an attempt for the definite abolishment of national welfare states via the European way. Critics from 
the left have always claimed that this was precisely the aim or at least the effect of the integration 
process (Bieling/Deppe 1995). 
The second model of European legitimation comes to similar results from a less conservative political 
standpoint and regards the EU as a “regulatory regime”. Starting from theoretical considerations 
suggesting that the EU cannot develop into a fully-fledged state, the Union is legitimated mainly by its 
superior problem-solving capacity in specific sectors. This technocratic legitimation of the EU 
(Majone 1993, 1995) rests on the distinction between efficiency-oriented regulatory policy and 
redistributive policy. Whereas the latter follows the classic democratic majority principle, the former 
has to be conferred to specialized regulatory agencies. The theory of the regulatory state argues that the EU is less dependent on its problematic parliamentary legitimacy if it concentrates on efficiency-
oriented policies. The authoritarian dangers of legitimation by expertise are considered to be rather 
small because the parliamentary legitimacy of the EU is sufficient to control regulatory agencies either 
by debating their broad political orientations (e.g. in the form of yearly reports or work programs) or 
by taking back specific issues into the political arena. Independently of their political desirability, both 
“economic constitution” and “regulatory regime” are at least plausible models of European institutions. 
They require only a modest parliamentary legitimation and are not logically linked to the model of the 
nation-state. 
A third possibility is the broad notion of the “negotiating state” (Scharpf 1991) which is able to grasp 
both the transformation of national governance and the emergence of an overarching political system. 
Like the model of the economic constitution, it is in accordance with the theory of the increasing 
resistance of functional sub-systems of society to external interference. Whereas the neoconservative 
idea of a market without a state7 elevates the safeguarding of the independence of the economic 
system to a normative postulate, the more social-democratically minded theory of the negotiating state 
merely takes the loose coupling of functional sub-systems as an empirical reality (Willke 1992). 
Governance of the sub-systems of society is considered neither impossible nor undesirable. In this 
perspective, governance seems possible if political theory abandons the image of the hierarchical state 
and the idea of the subordination of other functional sub-systems to the political system. Empirical 
studies show that functional sub-systems are characterized by the emergence of large sectoral 
corporate actors and thus develop an increasing capacity for collective action (Mayntz 1993b). At least 
in principle, the shortcomings of hierarchical governance which in the daily practice has often 
capitulated before insurmountable problems of information and complexity and the impenetrable logic 
of functional sub-systems can be compensated by horizontal coordination in negotiation systems where 
political actors take into account the action capacity of corporate actors in other sub-systems. In terms 
of efficiency, the ideal type of horizontal coordination is equivalent to the ideal type of hierarchical 
governance. In cases of failure of hierarchical governance, it is therefore not necessary to rely 
immediately on the self-coordinating forces of the market.  
The notion of “network” as a form of social organization between the state and the market probably 
offers a concept which is able to deal with the empirical observations regarding the transformation of 
national governance as well as the emergence of new forms of political organization beyond the state 
in the European Union. The qualification of networks in terms of the theory of democracy is yet 
unclear. It is uncontroversial that national negotiation systems already have a tendency to circumvent 
parliaments. Whether this particular democratic deficit has to be accepted as a deplorable but 
unavoidable effect of a general trend in the development of society which is nevertheless acceptable in 
national political systems because of the possibility to politicize any given issue (Scharpf 1993) or 
whether it is possible to identify even positive aspects in it is disputed. 
The political as well as the scientific debate are still dominated by normative models drawing on the 
ideal type of the state. In this case, legitimacy and democracy in fact mean parlamentarization. 
Institutional blueprints turn around the question of how to find the right balance between a 
representation of territorial units (the member states) and a direct representation of citizens (e.g. 
Weidenfeld 1994). Years ago, it has been questioned in the literature that democracy can simply be 
installed by a constitutional act (Kohler 1978).  
Even if one does not from the outset deny the possibility of legitimate European institutions with the 
argument that legitimate governance was only possible for an ethnically defined people which does not 
exist for the entire EU, there are certain pre-conditions to be met for the functioning of a political 
community. One of them is a minimum of a common political culture. A European political culture is 
probably slowly emerging in the European Union but it is a slow process which is not at the disposition 
of active political design. The minimum requirement for a political community constituting itself as the 
sovereign is the existence of a common language. Even if this requirement is played down, it is clear 
that a multi-linguistic political community needs fundamentally different institutions than a polity with 
a single language.  
For these and other reasons, state-oriented theories of legitimate governance discard the possibility of a 
European nation-state. At best, a European “state of nationalities” is considered possible (Lepsius 
1991). It follows from this view that the dynamics of integration has to be limited when it threatens to 
undermine the principle of democratic control of authority. This is not to be confused with backward-
looking demands for “renationalization” of the EU in the name of democratic theory. However, in the view of these scholars the scope and the depth of integration has reached a level which requires to 
search for principles and rules of behavior in order to make politics in the EU respect national 
autonomy and the legitimate interests of the Union at the same time (Scharpf 1994).  
Even if the outlines of a legitimate political order are still vague and there are still several options for 
political development, two things are clear. First, European integration is the focal point of a broader 
process of political, economic and social change leading to a transformation of governance to a degree 
which requires a rethinking of analytic as well as normative categories of responsible governance. It is 
necessary to think about equivalents to parliamentary democracy which are compatible with demands 
for participation by citizens. Second, it is also clear that a mere reconstitution of the state at the 
European level is very unlikely for the foreseeable future. The question whether responsible 
governance is possible at all in such a system is of major importance not only for the European Union 
but also for its member states. 
 
5. Questions for Integration Research 
This paper has discussed a central problem of politics as well as of political science, namely the 
transformation of governance in the context of European integration. We have stressed that although 
the EU has been our focus, these changes are not limited to it. Apart from internationalization, purely 
domestic developments (i.e. functional differentiation) lead to an increasing gap between the reality 
and the ideal type of the democratic nation-state which should be reflected in our theories and concepts. 
What does this imply for integration research? 
In the discussion in political science it has become a commonplace to state that a complete 
understanding of the European elephant (Puchala 1972) requires a new theoretical effort on a broad 
basis. After the self-declared “obsolescence” of neofunctionalism twenty years ago, integration 
research has lost its strong interdisciplinary character and has focused on questions within the confines 
of isolated disciplines or sub-disciplines. Many writings have completely lost theoretical questions out 
of sight. For this reason, scholars interested in theoretical approaches to European integration again 
and again referred to real or constructed neofunctionalist postulates. The only serious competition 
seems to come from international relations theory in the form of “neoliberal institutionalism”. 
However, contrasting neofunctionalism with neoliberal institutionalism only reproduces a debate of the 
1960s on the subject of the nature of the European polity, i.e. whether the latter was a new authority 
above the nation-state or merely a vehicle of dominant nation-states to stabilize their domestic 
authority under the conditions of international interdependence.  
In terms of research strategy, a direct continuation of the highly instructive and valuable theoretical 
discussion of the sixties and early seventies carries more disadvantages than advantages. It may indeed 
be useful to take the differentiated typologies of neofunctionalism (Lindberg 1971) as a starting point 
for the qualitative and quantitative assessment of the nature of the European polity by taking into 
account critical voices about the fields neglected by neofunctionalism, in particular the role of law. 
Still, discussing European integration in terms of neofunctionalist theory can hardly escape a certain 
technocratic bias and the idea of “overcoming” the nation-state. The possibility that the present stage 
of integration may be stable for the period in which scientific predictions do not yet lose any empirical 
grounding risks to be systematically neglected in this case. With the fiftieth birthday of the first EU-
institution approaching, scientific attention should be directed toward the problems and chances of 
responsible and responsive politics in the present stage of integration. In addition, controversies about 
the fate of the nation-state easily acquire the character of religious fights rather than scientific 
discussions. Finally, questions of democracy occupy a minor role in both neofunctionalist and 
neoliberalist thinking.  
The development of the European integration process has added a second major questions to 
integration research which was largely absent from the debate in the sixties and early seventies. The 
increasing action capacity of the EU leads to a transformation of existing political institutions, 
processes and policies in the member states. This process has major impacts on the action capacity of 
the state as well as on the possibility of democratic politics. Whether this process leads to the 
transformation of the principle of territorially organized politics, i.e. to the transformation of statehood, 
is a major question both for politics and for political science. Research on European integration which 
is theoretically interested and open for interdisciplinary questions should therefore take the likely 
stability of the present state of integration in the foreseeable future as a starting point for analytical as well as for normative work. In addition, it should regard the transformation of governance by 
integration in a dynamic multi-level system as its second pillar. 
Yet, the analysis of European integration offers more possibilities than the empirical investigation of a 
certainly important field in addition to theoretical and normative reflections about possible 
developments. European integration is a unique field for the inquiry into the developmental dynamics 
of modern societies under the conditions of internationalization and functional differentiation. For 
political science, this means posing the question of the organization of politics. Whereas international 
relations theory has taken up the consequences of the internationalization of problems and of 
international interdependence for state politics, research in the domestic field has been largely 
interested in the consequences of functional differentiation for societal governance. Both perspectives 
can be combined in integration research. This allows in an almost ideal manner an empirical approach 
to the discussion on the future of the state and on the validity of the idealized model of the externally 
and internally sovereign state. Still, a concern with the organization of politics at the end of the 
twentieth century should not remain restricted to an empirical inventory of the existing forms of 
modern governance. 
The concept of the state as the form of the political organization of society is deeply embedded not 
only in political science but also in a number of adjacent disciplines. In political science, it is 
constitutive for the distinction between the international and the domestic system and the respective 
sub-disciplines. Comparative research not only in political science often implicitly or explicitly 
compares societies or parts of societies organized as states. Central categories of political theory such 
as authority, legitimacy and democracy are implicitly linked to the model of the state. Integration 
research as part of the scientific analysis of politics offers the opportunity to problematize the implicit 
or explicit reference to the state in central scientific concepts and ask to which degree theories of 
politics implicitly rely on a concept of the state as the political organization of society.  
European integration is not only an empirical process with possible theoretical consequences for a 
number of social scientific disciplines and sub-disciplines but could also have an impact on the 
normative discussion. Some years ago, it has been deplored that an adequate normative theory of 
democratic participation and political responsibility which takes into account the reality of governance 
today and which could serve as a guidepost for public debates does not exist (Scharpf 1991: 630). This 
statement is still true. This lack of an adequate normative theory of modern governance stems from the 
lack of theoretical and analytical concepts enabling us to grasp the essence of modern governance 
which in turn can be explained by the fact that thinking about politics and the organization of society is 
deeply marked by notions derived from the historically successful model of the nineteenth-century 
nation-state. This is also the deeper reason why the major part of institutional blueprints for the 
European Union can be classified under the rubric of “federal state” or “union of states”. Both consider 
the state as the only possible organizational form of politics.  
The completion of the internal market probably marks the threshold beyond which the autonomy of the 
state is reduced by internationalization and functional differentiation to a degree which may lead to 
legitimation problems. Even if premature generalizations should be avoided it seems at least plausible 
that both tendencies have achieved a strength which makes the model of the sovereign state, developed 
from the Western European reality and spread throughout the world, an increasingly inadequate 
description of reality at least in its region of origin. A third tendency besides internationalization and 
functional differentiation which was largely neglected in this paper probably consists in the increasing 
fluidity of normative and social structures. The increase of societal contingency in the “risk society” 
(Beck 1986) might undermine the model of Western modernity with its specific mixture of capitalism, 
democracy, legality and sovereignty from below (Beck 1993: 17). 
Integration research has the rare opportunity to deal with a unique empirical phenomenon which is 
particularly appropriate to integrate these three tendencies into a realistic model of modern political 
organization. This would require a departure from a state-centric perspective which is becoming 
increasingly inadequate in the nation-state itself. It would offer the chance for the elaboration and 
further development of concepts and tools which could be of some use for political practice and social 
scientific theorizing alike. 
 
Bibliography 
Albert, Mathias (1994): “Postmoderne” und Theorie der internationalen Beziehungen, in: Zeitschrift 
für Internationale Politik 1, S. 45-63. Beck, Ulrich (1986): Risikogesellschaft. Auf dem Weg in eine andere Moderne (Frankfurt a.M.: 
Suhrkamp). 
Beck, Ulrich (1993): Die Erfindung des Politischen. Zu einer Theorie reflexiver Modernisierung 
(Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp). 
Behrens, Peter (1994): Die Wirtschaftsverfassung der Europäischen Gemeinschaft; in: Brüggemeier, 
Gert (ed.), Verfassungen für ein ziviles Europa, Baden-Baden, pp. 73-90. 
Bieling, Hans-Jürgen; Deppe, Frank (1995): Internationalisierung, Integration und politische 
Regulierung; in: Jachtenfuchs, Markus; Kohler-Koch, Beate (eds.), Europäische Integration (Opladen: 
Leske + Budrich) (forthcoming). 
Bull, Hedley (1977): The Anarchical Society. A Study of Order in World Politics (New York: 
Columbia University Press). 
Burley, Anne-Marie; Mattli, Walter (1993): Europe before the Court: A Political Theory of Legal 
Integration; in: International Organisation 47, pp. 41-76. 
Busch, Klaus (1995): Spill-over-Dynamik und Spill-back-Potential in der europäischen 
Währungsintegration. Ein Beitrag zur Integrationstheorie; in: Jachtenfuchs, Markus; Kohler-Koch, 
Beate (eds.), Europäische Integration (Opladen: Leske + Budrich) (forthcoming). 
BVerfGE (1994): Urteil zum Maastricht-Vertrag; in: Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts 
85, pp. 155-213. 
Eichener, Volker (1992): Social Dumping or Innovative Regulation? Processes and Outcomes of 
European Decision-Making in the Sector of Health and Safety at Work Regulation (Florence: 
European University Institute, Working Paper SPS 92/28). 
Eichener, Volker (1995): Die Rückwirkung der europäischen Integration auf nationale Politikmuster; 
in: Jachtenfuchs, Markus; Kohler-Koch, Beate (eds.), Europäische Integration (Opladen: Leske + 
Budrich) (forthcoming). 
Ellwein, Thomas (1992): Staatlichkeit im Wandel. Das Staatsmodell des 19. Jahrhunderts als 
Verständnisbarriere; in: Kohler-Koch, Beate (ed.), Staat und Demokratie in Europa (Opladen: Leske + 
Budrich), pp. 73-82. 
Gehring, Thomas (1994): Der Beitrag von Institutionen zur Förderung der internationalen 
Zusammenarbeit. Lehren aus der institutionellen Struktur der Europäischen Gemeinschaft; in: 
Zeitschrift für Internationale Beziehungen 1, pp. 211-242. 
Gehring, Thomas (1995): Regieren im internationalen System. Verhandlungen, Normen und 
Internationale Regime; in: Politische Vierteljahresschrift (i.E.). 
Graf Kielmansegg, Peter (1995): Integration und Demokratie; in: Jachtenfuchs, Markus; Kohler-Koch, 
Beate (eds.), Europäische Integration (Opladen: Leske + Budrich) (forthcoming). 
Grande, Edgar (1995): Das Paradox der Schwäche. Forschungspolitik und die Einflußlogik 
europäischer Politikverflechtung; in: Jachtenfuchs, Markus; Kohler-Koch, Beate (eds.), Europäische 
Integration (Opladen: Leske + Budrich) (forthcoming). 
Haas, Ernst B. (1971): The Study of Regional Integration: Reflections on the Joy and Anguish of 
Pretheorizing; in: Lindberg, Leon N.; Scheingold, Stuart A. (eds.) (1971): Regional Integration. Theory 
and Research, Cambridge, MA, pp. 3-42. 
Haas, Peter M. (1992): Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination; in: 
International Organization 46, pp. 1-35. 
Habermas, Jürgen (1992): Staatsbürgerschaft und nationale Identität; in: ders.: Faktizität und Geltung, 
Frankfurt a.M., pp. 632-659. 
Held, David (1991): Democracy, the Nation-State and the Global System; in: Economy and Society 20, 
pp. 138-172. 
Héritier, Adrienne; Mingers, Susanne; Knill, Christoph; Becka, Martina (1994): Die Veränderung von 
Staatlichkeit in Europa. Ein regulativer Wettbewerb: Deutschland, Großbritannien, Frankreich, 
Opladen. 
Héritier, Adrienne (ed.) (1993): Policy-Analyse. Kritik und Neuorientierung (PVS-Sonderheft 24) 
(Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag). 
Hoffmann, Stanley G. (1966): Obstinate or Obsolete? The Fate of the Nation State in the Case of 
Western Europe; in: Daedalus 95, pp. 862-915. 
Hoffmann, Stanley G. (1982): Reflections on the Nation-State in Western Europe Today; in: Journal of 
Common Market Studies 21, pp. 21-37. 
Ipsen, Hans-Peter (1972): Europäisches Gemeinschaftsrecht (Tübingen). Isensee, Josef; Mikat, Paul; Honecker, Martin; Suttner, Ernst Chr. (1985): “Staat”; in: Görres-
Gesellschaft (ed.): Staatslexikon, Freiburg etc., pp. 133-170. 
Jachtenfuchs, Markus; Kohler-Koch, Beate (eds.) (1995): Europäische Integration (Opladen: Leske + 
Budrich) (to appear in autumn 1995). 
Jachtenfuchs, Markus (1995): Regieren durch Überzeugen. Die Europäische Union und der 
Treibhauseffekt; in: Jachtenfuchs, Markus; Kohler-Koch, Beate (eds.), Europäische Integration 
(Opladen: Leske + Budrich) (forthcoming). 
Jachtenfuchs, Markus (1995): Theoretical Perspectives on European Governance; in: European Law 
Journal 1, pp. 115-133. 
Jansen, Dorothea; Schubert, Klaus (1995): Netzwerke und Politikproduktion. Konzepte, Methoden, 
Perspektiven, Marburg. 
Joerges, Christian (1993): Wirtschaftsrecht, Nationalstaat und der Vertrag von Maastricht; in: 
Leviathan 21, pp. 493-516. 
Joerges, Christian (1995): Das Recht im Prozeß der europäischen Integration; in: Jachtenfuchs, Markus; 
Kohler-Koch, Beate (eds.), Europäische Integration (Opladen: Leske + Budrich) (forthcoming). 
Keohane, Robert O.; Hoffmann, Stanley (1991): Institutional Change in Europe in the 1980s; in: dies. 
(eds.): The New European Community. Decisionmaking and Institutional Change, Boulder, CO etc., 
pp. 1-39. 
Kirchhof, Paul (1992): Der deutsche Staat im Prozeß der europäischen Integration; in: Isensee, Josef; 
Kirchhof, Paul (eds.), Handbuch des Staatsrechts der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Bd. VII, 
Heidelberg, pp. 855-878. 
Kohler, Beate (1978): Der Abgeordnete als Vertreter des europäischen Volkes? Die Demokratietheorie 
vor der Bewährungsprobe; in: Europarecht 13, pp. 333-350. 
Kohler-Koch, Beate (1993) Die Welt regieren ohne Weltregierung; in: Carl Böhret; Göttrik Wewer 
(eds.), Regieren im 21. Jahrhundert – zwischen Globalisierung und Regionalisierung. Festgabe für 
Hans-Hermann Hartwich zum 65. Geburtstag (Opladen), pp. 109-141. 
Kohler-Koch, Beate (1995a): The Strength of Weakness: The Transformation of Governance in the EU; 
conference paper, Uppsala, April 1995. 
Kohler-Koch, Beate (1995b): Die Gestaltungsmacht wirtschaftlicher Interessen; in: Jachtenfuchs, 
Markus; Kohler-Koch, Beate (eds.), Europäische Integration (Opladen: Leske + Budrich) 
(forthcoming). 
Kohler-Koch, Beate (ed.) (1989): Regime in den internationalen Beziehungen (Baden-Baden: Nomos). 
Kooiman, Jan (1933): Social-Political Governance: Introduction; in: id. (ed.), Modern Governance. 
New Government-Society Interactions (London: Sage), pp.1-9. 
Lepsius, M. Rainer (1991): Nationalstaat oder Nationalitätenstaat als Modell für die 
Weiterentwicklung der Europäischen Gemeinschaft; in: Wildenmann, Rudolf (ed.), Staatswerdung 
Europas? Optionen für eine Europäische Union, Baden-Baden, pp. 19-40. 
Lindberg, Leon N.; Scheingold, Stuart A. (1970): Europe’s Would-Be Polity. Patterns of Change in the 
European Community, Englewood Cliffs, NJ. 
Lindberg, Leon N.; Scheingold, Stuart A. (eds.) (1971): Regional Integration. Theory and Research, 
Cambridge, MA. 
Lindberg, Leon N. (1971): Political Integration as a Multidimensional Phenomenon Requiring 
Multivariate Measurement; in: Leon N. Lindberg; Stuart S. Scheingold (eds.), Regional Integration. 
Theory and Research, Cambridge, MA, pp. 45-127. 
Luhmann, Niklas (1969): Legitimation durch Verfahren (Neuwied: Luchterhand). 
Luhmann, Niklas (1981): Politische Theorie im Wohlfahrtsstaat, München/Wien. 
Luhmann, Niklas (1987): Staat und Politik. Zur Semantik der Selbstbeschreibung politischer Systeme; 
in: ders., Soziologische Aufklärung 4. Beiträge zur funktionalen Differenzierung der Gesellschaft, 
Opladen, pp. 74-103. 
Majone, Giandomenico (1993): Wann ist Policy-Deliberation wichtig?, in: Héritier, Adrienne (ed.): 
Policy-Analyse. Kritik und Neuorientierung (PVS-Sonderheft 24/1993), Opladen, pp. 97-115. 
Majone, Giandomenico (1995): Redistributive und sozialregulative Politik; in: Jachtenfuchs, Markus; 
Kohler-Koch, Beate (eds.), Europäische Integration (Opladen: Leske + Budrich) (forthcoming). 
Mancini, G. Federico (1991): The Making of a Constitution for Europe; in: Keohane, Robert O.; 
Hoffmann, Stanley: The New European Community. Decisionmaking and Institutional Change, 
Boulder,CO etc., pp. 177-194. March, James G.; Olsen, Johan P. (1983): Organizing Political Life: What Administrative 
Reorganization Tells Us About Government; in: American Political Science Review 77, pp. 281-296. 
Marks, Gary (1995): Politische Einflußlogik und Regieren am Beispiel der EU-Strukturpolitik; in: 
Jachtenfuchs, Markus; Kohler-Koch, Beate (eds.), Europäische Integration (Opladen: Leske + Budrich) 
(forthcoming). 
Mayntz, Renate (1987): Politische Steuerung und gesellschaftliche Steuerungsprobleme – 
Anmerkungen zu einem theoretischen Paradigma; in: Jachbuch zur Staats- und 
Verwaltungswissenschaft 1, pp. 89-110. 
Mayntz, Renate (1993): Policy-Netzwerke und die Logik von Verhandlungssystemen; in: Héritier, 
Adrienne (ed.), Policy-Analyse. Kritik und Neuorientierung (PVS-Sonderheft 24) (Opladen), pp. 39-56. 
Mayntz, Renate (1993a): Governing Failures and the Problem of Governability: Some Comments on a 
Theoretical Paradigm; in: Kooiman, Jan (ed.), Modern Governance. New Government-Society 
Interactions (London: Sage), pp. 9-21. 
Mayntz, Renate (1993b): Policy-Netzwerke und die Logik von Verhandlungssystemen; in: Héritier, 
Adrienne (ed.), Policy-Analyse. Kritik und Neuorientierung (PVS-Sonderheft 24) (Opladen: 
Westdeutscher Verlag), pp. 39-56. 
Milward, Alan S. (1992): The European Rescue of the Nation-State (London: Routledge). 
Moravcsik, Andrew (1991): Negotiating the Single European Act. National Interests and Conventional 
Statecraft in the European Community; in: International Organization 45, pp. 19-56.  
Moravcsik, Andrew (1993): Preferences and Power in the European Community. A Liberal 
Intergovernmentalist Approach; in: Journal of Common Market Studies 31, pp. 473-524. 
Moravcsik, Andrew (1994): Why the European Community Strengthens the State: Domestic Politics 
and International Cooperation. Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political 
Science Association, New York, September 1-4, 1994. 
Nye, Joseph (1971): Peace in Parts. Integration and Conflict in Regional Organization, Boston. 
Olsen, Johann P. (1995): Europeanization and Nation-State Dynamics, ARENA working paper 95/9, 
Oslo. 
Petersmann, Ernst Ulrich (1994): Grundprobleme der Wirtschaftsverfassung der EG; in: 
Außenwirtschaft 48, pp. 389-414. 
Puchala, Donald (1972): Of Blind Men, Elephants, and International Integration; in: Journal of 
Common Market Studies. 
Rittberger, Volker (ed.) (1993): Regime Theory and International Relations (Oxford). 
Rokkan, Stein (1975): Dimensions of State Formation and Nation Building. A Possible Paradigm for 
Research on Variations within Europe; in: Tilly, Charles (ed.), The Formation of National States in 
Western Europe, Princeton, pp. 562-600. 
Rosenau, James N.; Czempiel, Ernst-Otto (1992): Governance without Government. Order and Change 
in World Politics (Cambridge). 
Ruggie, John Gerald (1993): Territoriality and Beyond. Problematizing Modernity in International 
Relations; in: International Organization 47, pp. 139-174. 
Sandholtz, Wayne; Zysman, John: 1992: Recasting the European Bargain; in: World Politics 42, pp. 
95-128. 
Sandholtz, Wayne (1993): Choosing Union: Monetary Politics and Maastricht; in: International 
Organization 47, pp. 1-39. 
Sbragia, Alberta M. (1992): Thinking About the European Future: The Uses of Comparison; in: id. 
(ed.), Euro-Politics. Institutions and Policymaking in the “New” European Community, Washington, 
pp. 257-291. 
Schaber, Thomas/Ulbert, Cornelia (1994): Reflexivität in den Internationalen Beziehungen. 
Literaturbericht zum Beitrag kognitiver, reflexiver und interpretativer Ansätze zur dritten 
Theoriedebatte; in: Zeitschrift für Internationale Beziehungen 1, pp. 139-169. 
Scharpf, Fritz W. (1985): Die Politikverflechtungsfalle. Europäische Integration und deutscher 
Föderalismus im Vergleich; in: Politische Vierteljahresschrift 26, pp. 323-356. 
Scharpf, Fritz W. (1988): The Joint-Decision Trap: Lessons from German Federalism and European 
Integration; in: Public Administration 66, pp. 239-278. 
Scharpf, Fritz W. (1991): Die Handlungsfähigkeit des Staates am Ende des zwanzigsten Jahrhunderts; 
in: Politische Vierteljahresschrift 32, pp. 621-634. Scharpf, Fritz W. (1993): Versuch über Demokratie im verhandelnden Staat; in: Roland Czada; 
Manfred G. Schmitt (eds.): Verhandlungsdemokratie, Interessenvermittlung, Regierbarkeit. Festschrift 
für Gerhard Lehmbruch, Opladen, pp. 25-50. 
Scharpf, Fritz W. (1993b): Versuch über Demokratie im verhandelnden Staat; in: Roland Czada; 
Manfred G. Schmitt (eds.): Verhandlungsdemokratie, Interessenvermittlung, Regierbarkeit. Festschrift 
für Gerhard Lehmbruch (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag), pp. 25-50. 
Scharpf, Fritz W. (1994): Autonomieschonend und gemeinschaftsverträglich. Zur Logik einer 
europäischen Mehrebenenpolitik; in: ders., Optionen des Föderalismus in Deutschland und Europa, 
Frankfurt a.M./New York, pp. 131-155. 
Scharpf, Fritz W. (1995): Politische Optionen im vollendeten Binnenmarkt; in: Jachtenfuchs, Markus; 
Kohler-Koch, Beate (eds.), Europäische Integration (Opladen: Leske + Budrich) (forthcoming). 
Scharpf, Fritz W. (ed.) (1993a): Games in Hierarchies and Networks. Analytical and Empirical 
Approaches to the Study of Governance Institutions (Frankfurt a.M.: Campus).  
Schmitter, Philippe C. (1992): Representation and the Future Euro-Polity; in: Staatswissenschaften und 
Staatspraxis 3, pp. 379-405. 
Schulze, Hagen (1994): Staat und Nation in der europäischen Geschichte, München. 
Streeck, Wolfgang (1994): Public Power Beyond the Nation State? The Case of the European 
Community; in: Boyer, Robert; Drache, Daniel (eds.), The Future of Nations and the Limits of Markets 
(Toronto). 
Streit, Manfred E.; Mussler, Werner (1995), The Economic Constitution of the European Community - 
From “Rome” to “Maastricht”; in: European Law Journal 1 (in press). 
Tilly, Charles (ed.) (1975): The Formation of National States in Western Europe, Princeton. 
von Bogdandy, Armin; Nettesheim, Martin (1995): Kommentar zu Artikel 1 EGV; in: Grabitz, 
Eberhard; Hilf, Meinhard (eds.), Kommentar zur Europäischen Union, München. 
von Bogdandy, Armin (1993): Supranationale Union als neuer Herrschaftstypus: Entstaatlichung und 
Vergemeinschaftung in staatstheoretischer Perspektive; in: Integration 16, pp. 210-214. 
von der Groeben, Hans; Hrbek, Rudolf; Schneider, Heinrich; Möller, Hans (1980): Die Europäische 
Union als Prozeß, Baden-Baden. 
Voruba, Georg (1993): Bedeutungsverluste von Staatsgrenzen; in: Österreichische Zeitschrift für 
Politikwissenschaft, pp. 85-92.  
Wallace, Helen (1995): Die Dynamik des EU-Institutionengefüges; in: Jachtenfuchs, Markus; Kohler-
Koch, Beate (eds.), Europäische Integration (Opladen: Leske + Budrich) (forthcoming). 
Weiler, Joseph H.H. (1981): The Community System. The Dual Character of Supranationalism; in: 
Yearbook of European Law 1, pp. 267-306. 
Weiler, Joseph H.H. (1982): Community, Member States and European Integration. Is the Law 
relevant?; in: Journal of Common Market Studies 21, pp. 39-56. 
Wessels, Wolfgang (1995): Verwaltung im Mehrebenensystem. Auf dem Weg zur Megabürokratie?; in: 
Jachtenfuchs, Markus; Kohler-Koch, Beate (eds.), Europäische Integration (Opladen: Leske + Budrich) 
(forthcoming). 
Wildenmann, Rudolf (ed.) (1991): Staatswerdung Europas? Optionen für eine Europäische Union, 
Baden-Baden. 
Williamson, Oliver E. (1975): Markets and Hierarchies. Analysis and Antitrust Implications. A Study 
in the Economics of Internal Organization (New York: The Free Press). 
Willke, Helmut (1992): Ironie des Staates. Grundlinien einer Staatstheorie polyzentrischer Gesellschaft, 
Frankfurt a.M. 
Zürn, Michael (1995): The Challenge of Globalization and Individualization: A View from Europe; in: 
Holm, Hans-Henrik; Sørensen, Georg (eds.), Whose World Order? Uneven Globalization and the End 
of the Cold War (Boulder etc.), pp. 137-163. 
 